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ABSTRACT
With more than 500 million daily tweets from over 330 million
active users, Twier constantly aracts malicious users aiming to
carry out phishing and malware-related aacks against its user
base. It therefore becomes of paramount importance to assess the
eectiveness of Twier’s use of blacklists in protecting its users
from such threats. We collected more than 182 million public tweets
containing URLs from Twier’s Stream API over a 2-month period
and compared these URLs against 3 popular phishing, social engi-
neering, and malware blacklists, including Google Safe Browsing
(GSB). We focus on the delay period between an aack URL rst
being tweeted to appearing on a blacklist, as this is the timeframe
in which blacklists do not warn users, leaving them vulnerable. Ex-
periments show that, whilst GSB is eective at blocking a number
of social engineering and malicious URLs within 6 hours of being
tweeted, a signicant number of URLs go undetected for at least 20
days. For instance, during one month, we discovered 4,930 tweets
containing URLs leading to social engineering websites that had
been tweeted to over 131 million Twier users. We also discovered
1,126 tweets containing 376 blacklisted Bitly URLs that had a com-
bined total of 991,012 clicks, posing serious security and privacy
threats. In addition, an equally large number of URLs contained
within public tweets remain in GSB for at least 150 days, raising
questions about potential false positives in the blacklist. We also
provide evidence to suggest that Twier may no longer be using
GSB to protect its users.
CCS CONCEPTS
•Security and privacy→Malware and its mitigation; Phish-
ing; •General and reference→ Empirical studies; Measurement;
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1 INTRODUCTION
Since its creation in 2006, Twier has gained over 974 million users
with 330 million active users per month posting 500 million tweets
per day [2]. Among these Twier users are many high prole
celebrities, politicians, heads of state and societal inuencers whom
aract large numbers of followers [39]. Due to this large user base,
Twier makes an aractive target for malicious users aiming to
carry out phishing and malware aacks to exploit people. One of
the main ways these aacks are carried out is by leading victims to
a malicious site, by including one or more URLs in a tweet, whereby
the aack can occur.
Phishing aacks on Twier have been known to lure victims
in by oering verication on the social network but instead take
them to a fake login page to steal their Twier username and pass-
word [4], while malware aacks have included drive-by-download
links contained within tweets, cross-site scripting aacks [1], and
Android malware that is controlled by tweets [9].
Twier has come under increasing pressure to protect its users
against these aacks, such as, in 2010 when the company seled a
case with the US Federal Trade Commission inwhich Twier agreed
to strengthen security throughout the platform and to carry out an
independently assessed bi-annual information security audit [11].
One of the ways in which Twier is improving its security for
users is by implementing numerous rules that govern what type
of content users of the platform can and cannot send [38]. In 2009,
it was reported [24] that Twier had started to use the phishing
and malware blacklist Google Safe Browsing (GSB), already used by
popular web browsers to lter out and protect its users from aack
URLs. We provide evidence that suggests Twier is not using GSB
eectively to protect its users.
Our paper aims to assess how eective Twier’s use of blacklists
is in protecting its users from phishing and malware aacks. In
particular, we focus on the delay period between an aack URL rst
being tweeted to appearing in one of 3 dened blacklists, as this
is the timeframe in which blacklists do not warn users against the
aack. We collected over 182 million public tweets containing URLs
from Twier’s Stream API over a 2-month period and compared
these URLs against 3 popular phishing, social engineering, and
malware blacklists that are used in leading web browsers, antivirus
solutions, and other online protection technologies.
During one month we discovered 4,930 tweets containing URLs
leading to social engineering websites that had been tweeted to
over 131 million Twier users. e majority of URLs contained
within these tweets took between 20 and 30 days to appear in
GSB. We focus on GSB because it is the main protection used in
popular web browsers. In the same month we also discovered 1,126
tweets containing 376 blacklisted Bitly URLs that had a combined
total of 991,012 clicks – these Bitly URLs represent 11% of the total
blacklisted social engineering URLs in our dataset for that month.
is demonstrates that Twier users are clicking on and being
exposed to dangerous websites.
We also discovered that, while the GSB blacklist is eective
at blocking a large number of social engineering and malicious
URLs within 6 hours of being tweeted, a large number of URLs go
undetected for at least 20 days, with users potentially exposed to
aacks during this delay. In addition, an equally large number of
URLs contained within public tweets remained in the GSB blacklist
for at least 150 days, potentially raising issues with false positives
in the blacklist.
Twier provides a Stream API to access a source of live tweets.
ere are 3 ways of accessing this API: the lter/sample, decahose,
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and rehose streams. ese feeds contain, approximately, 1%, 10%,
and 100% of all public tweets, respectively. e lter/sample feed is
free to access, while the decahose and rehose feeds come at a sub-
stantial cost. Our study made use of Twier’s lter/sample stream.
ere are methodological limitations to using this smaller sample
feed. For example, URLs of interest may not be contained in the
feed we receive. We compensate as much as possible for this, with
techniques such as using Twier’s Search API to determine original
tweet date instead of relying entirely on what our 1% sample tells
us.
To the best of our knowledge ours is the rst in-depth study that
specically focuses on the impact of blacklist delays on Twier
trac. Our study provides a present-day snapshot of the current
state of phishing and malware URLs being posted to Twier. A
previous study from 2010 [15] took important rst steps in this
direction, but Twier’s active user base has grown from 30 million
users in 2010 to 330 million users in 2017 [35] and the number
of daily tweets has grown from 35 million in 2010 to over 500
million in 2017 [16]. We replicate the experiment of [15] (to the
extent we can in the face of missing details in [15]) but also present
a more comprehensive and detailed analysis of malicious URLs
on Twier. In particular, we introduce a new methodology to
measure delay fromrst tweet tomembership in theGSB blacklist to
determine eectiveness of Twier URL blacklists. We are also able
to determine worst-case scenario delay periods, and we measure
the duration of time that URLs stay in GSB.
We organise the remainder of this paper into the following sec-
tions: Section 2 introduces the background and related work, Sec-
tion 3 describes the design and infrastructure we used to carry out
experiments and the experiments themselves, Section 4 describes
how we implemented the infrastructure and experiments, Section 5
presents our results, Section 6 discusses the main ndings, and
Section 7 provides concluding remarks.
2 BACKGROUND AND RELATEDWORK
2.1 Blacklists
A blacklist is dened as a set of elements to be blocked; an access
control list. Our study looks at phishing and malware blacklists
that are used to block access to URLs posted to Twier. We focus
on 3 blacklists: Google Safe Browsing [13], Open Phish [25], and
Phish Tank [29].
Google Safe Browsing: Google Safe Browsing (GSB) is a URL
blacklist that contains both malicious and phishing URLs and is
used by the web browsers Google Chrome, Safari, Firefox, Opera,
and Vivaldi to protect users from dangerous websites. We focus
on GSB in our study because of its prominence in popular web
browsers: already in 2012 GSB was protecting 600 million users
from dangerous websites [41]. In 2015 GSB began using the term
“Social Engineering” to categorise phishing websites which also
encompass additional types of deceptive content. Google denes
a social engineering web aack as occurring when either: “the
content pretends to act, or looks and feels, like a trusted entity
- like a bank or government” or “the content tries to trick you
into doing something you would only do for a trusted entity - like
sharing a password or calling tech support” [12]. During the week
commencing 3rd September 2017 the total number of sites deemed
dangerous by GSB was 573,433 phishing and 500,245 malicious.
During that week GSB detected 24,756 new phishing sites and 6,312
new malware sites. GSB denes malware websites in its blacklist
as being either compromised or aack. A compromised website is
a legitimate website that has been hijacked to either include, or
direct users to, malicious content. An aack site is a website that
has intentionally been set up to host and distribute malware [14].
During the week commencing 3rd September 2017, GSB identied
5,981 new compromised websites and 335 new aack websites.
GSB provides two APIs for accessing its blacklist: Lookup and
Update. e Lookup API provides a remote service whereby URLs
to be checked are sent to Google’s servers and a response is returned
for each URL stating if the URL is in the blacklist. e Update API
provides the user with a local copy of the blacklist, this local copy is
stored as a database of SHA-256 URL hash prexes, the majority of
the hash prexes being 4 bytes. To perform a URL blacklist lookup,
the URL hash prex is checked in the local database and, if there is
a prex match, then the full URL hash is retrieved from Google’s
servers to determine if there is a match on the full hash.
Open Phish: Open Phish launched in 2014 and is the result of a 3
year research project on phishing detection that uses autonomous
algorithms to detect zero day phishing websites. Our study has
access to the academic feed. Open Phish is used by the antivirus
companies Virus Total and Strong Arm. e Open Phish blacklist
can be downloaded as a JSON le which typically contains around
5,000 unique URLs.
Phish Tank: Phish Tank launched in October 2006 and provides
a community-based phishing website reporting and verication
system. Users of the website can submit URLs of suspected phishing
websites; the Phish Tank community then vote as to whether these
URLs are phishing or not. Phish Tank is used by the web browser
Opera, online reputation and internet safety service web browser
plugin Web Of Trust, email provider Yahoo! Mail, and antivirus
providers McAfee and Kaspersky [28]. e Phish Tank blacklist
of approved phishing URLs can be downloaded as a JSON le and
typically contains around 23,000 unique URLs.
2.2 Related Work
Existing literature has explored the eectiveness of malware black-
lists [18, 19] and also phishing aacks in areas such as why they
work [7], the eectiveness of toolbars in protecting users [42,
43], detection of phishing websites [44], the eectiveness of web
browser warnings [8], demographic analysis of phishing susceptibil-
ity and eectiveness of interventions [31], and a study to determine
a baseline for phishing campaign success [17]. ere are also var-
ious techniques to prevent phishing aacks including Dynamic
Security Skins [6], Trusted Devices [27] along with educational as-
pects of phishing training including PhishGuru [20] and the game
Anti-Phishing Phil [32]; the eectiveness of these two educational
approaches were analysed [21]. Previous studies have also devel-
oped techniques to detect spam, phishing and malware on Twier,
such as looking at redirection chains to detect suspicious URLs [22],
analysing suspended accounts [36], and using social graph models
[40]. Phishers that use URL shortening services to masquerade
phishing URLs on Twier have also been studied [5].
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Two key studies, carried out in 2007 [23] and 2009 [33] focused
on phishing blacklists and how eective they are at protecting users
from phishing email aacks, paying particular aention to the delay
from an email containing a phishing URL being received to that
URL appearing in a blacklist. We focus on Twier as a delivery
platform rather than e-mail.
Whilst these previous studies have looked at the phishing land-
scape in terms of detecting and preventing phishing aacks, they
have not focused specically on the relationship between blacklists
and phishing and malware aacks on Twier. However, in a 2010
study, Grier et al. [15] characterised phishing, malware and scam
URLs posted to Twier. As part of their broad study, of which their
overall aim was to characterise spam on Twier, they analysed
blacklist performance, looking at the blacklists GSB, Joewein, and
URIBL. One of their main ndings was that malicious URLs either
appeared in the GSB blacklist, on average, 29.58 days before being
tweeted or, if the URLs were not blacklisted at time of tweeting, it
took, on average, 24.9 days for the GSB blacklist to detect the URLs.
Phishing URLs either appeared in the GSB blacklist, on average
2.57 days before being tweeted, or, if not in the blacklist at time of
tweet, an average of 9.01 days aer tweeting.
Whilst the Grier et al. study looked at the delay for tweeted URLs
to appear in a blacklist, it treated multiple tweets of the same URL
as being unique, independent events. We take a dierent approach.
We focus on the delay time between when a blacklisted URL is
rst tweeted to when it rst appears in a blacklist such as GSB. We
believe this provides a more accurate measurement to ascertain the
eectiveness of Twier URL blacklisting. is is because it enables
us to determine how long users are exposed to a specic aack
URL since it was rst posted to Twier. One of the main problems
with the methodology in [15] is that a URL may be tweeted at a
certain point in time, then tweeted again on multiple occasions at
much later dates, closer to the point at which that URL becomes
blacklisted. is then skews the results because the average delay
time for that URL to become blacklisted, when calculated using all
tweet times containing that URL, will appear to be smaller than the
time of rst tweet to blacklist delay. is will tend to underestimate
the exposure of users.
A missing detail from [15] is how the historical blacklist data
from GSB was obtained. Our study uses timestamps of when URL
hash prexes were downloaded into our local copy of GSB to de-
termine when a URL rst appeared in the GSB blacklist. Grier et
al. [15] were also not specic about which version of Twier’s
Stream API they use, other than mentioning that it is a 10% feed.
It is important to note that a 10% feed in 2010 will have produced
approximately 3.5 million tweets per day – similar to the 3 million
tweets per day that we collect in our study. e methodology sec-
tion of our paper explains what version of Twier’s Stream API we
used, in an eort to improve the reproducibility of our study.
It is important to note that the aim of [15] was to characterise
spam on Twier, looking at phishing, malware, and scams; that
study touched on blacklist performance as part of an overall, broad
analysis of spam on Twier. In contrast, our paper aims to assess
how eective Twier’s use of blacklists are at protecting its users
from phishing and malware aacks. In contrast, we carry out
a more ne-grained and in-depth study into the eectiveness of
blacklists on Twier, particularly focusing on delay periods. As
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Figure 1: Infrastructure design architecture.
well as replicating the relevant experiments from [15], we also
introduce a newmethodology to measure the delay between when a
blacklisted URL isrst tweeted towhen it rst appears in a blacklist.
We also add the Phish Tank and Open Phish phishing blacklists to
our study. Finally, and importantly, we check redirection chains for
each tweeted URL, since blacklisted URLs may be hidden in such
chains.
3 DESIGN
3.1 Overview
e infrastructure used to carry out experiments for our study
consists of a tweet collection system that receives both sample
tweets and also tweets containing URLs from Twier; a database
to store these collected tweets; a URL redirection chain extractor;
a blacklist system to store, update and perform lookups against 3
popular blacklists; a database to store tweeted URLs which have
appeared in a blacklist; a Twier search API lookup system to
determine when tweeted URLs rst appeared on Twier; and a
measurement system to calculate delays from URLs being tweeted
to appearing in blacklists. e overall architecture of this system
can be seen in Figure 1.
3.2 Data Collection
e rst requirement for our study is a source of live tweets from
Twier. To achieve this we setup two sources of incoming tweet
feeds using Twier’s Stream API. e rst stream is, approximately,
a 1% sample of all global tweets and the second stream is, approxi-
mately, a 1% sample of all global tweets that contain one or more
URLs. e rst stream is used to provide a general picture of Twier
activity during collection and the second stream is used to carry
out our blacklist delay analysis by looking up the tweeted URLs in
various blacklists. Both of these tweet streams are saved locally in
a database.
e second requirement for our study is a way to store and
search various blacklists. For our study 3 blacklists are used: GSB,
Open Phish, and Phish Tank. e GSB blacklist includes both social
engineering and malicious URLs. Our system regularly obtains the
latest copies of these blacklists and saves them locally in a database
on our system. Tweeted URLs from our collection of tweets can
then be searched for in these 3 blacklists.
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3.3 Methodology
As described in the previous subsection, tweets containing URLs are
collected from the Twier stream and saved into a local database.
3 blacklists are also stored in the local database. In order to deter-
mine which tweeted URLs appear in the 3 blacklists two systems
are used: fast and slow. e fast system checks the 3 million most
recently tweeted URLs (equivalent to about 24 hours of tweets)
against the GSB blacklist every 10 minutes and the Open Phish and
Phish Tank blacklists every hour. We determined this 10 minute
update frequency by carrying out a small-scale study to observe
how frequently the GSB Update API blacklist updates. Open Phish
and Phish Tank refresh their blacklists every 60 minutes. e slow
system checks all tweeted URLs we have collected since our ex-
periment began and performs a lookup on the latest versions of
all 3 blacklists. is slow lookup system will complete its cycle of
all URLs relatively quickly at rst but increase in duration as the
number of URLs in the experiment grow. e main slowdown in
this lookup system is that the GSB API requires any hash prex
match to be sent to GSB’s servers for the full hash to be downloaded
then checked for a match. is system is necessarily slower in its
operation, taking a number of hours to complete a pass over our
full collection of tweets. e reason for these two lookup systems
(fast and slow) is because GSB does not include a “time of inclusion”
for blacklisted URLs. is system helps us to determine when URLs
appear in the GSB blacklist, with ner resolution on URLs that are
tweeted within 24 hours. e outcome is that we can produce more
accurate results in our measurements.
During the experiment it was discovered that the library imple-
mentation we use for GSB’s Update API also stores timestamps
for when blacklisted URL hash prexes were added to the local
database. We then built a system to lookup each blacklisted URL’s
hash prex timestamp to determine when each URL was added to
our local copy of the blacklist. e GSB Update API library stores
each blacklisted URL as a 4-byte SHA256 hash prex; due to the
small size of these URL hash prexes, there is a chance that col-
lisions may occur. Because of this, only hash prex lookups that
had zero collisions were used for the experimental results. is
additional system complements the previously mentioned fast and
slow lookup systems because the new system will produce more
accurate results for when a URL is already in GSB – particularly if
a URL has been in GSB for a signicant amount of time. e fast
and slow systems are still required for when tweeted URLs are not
in GSB at time of tweet.
For a tweeted URL, there could be a number of hops or redirec-
tions that are made before arriving at the nal landing page. For
this reason a redirection chain extractor is used to check each URL
contained within in a redirection chain against each of the black-
lists. e technicalities of this redirection chain extractor system
are explained in more detail in the implementation section.
When calculating the time from a tweet appearing in the Twier
Stream feed to appearing in one of the 3 dened blacklists, some
tweeted URLs may have previously appeared on Twier prior to be-
ing received in the Twier Stream feed. To compensate for this, we
carry out another experiment. In this experiment, when computing
delays from time of tweet to time of blacklist appearance, we built
a system to lookup each blacklisted URL in Twier’s Search API.
Our system can determine when the URL was rst tweeted; this
timestamp can then be used to calculate the delay between rst
tweet and rst blacklist appearance, therefore increasing the accu-
racy of the measurement. Limitations of using this approach, as
stated in Twier’s Search API documentation, are that it is limited
to 7-10 days, it is not an exhaustive source of tweet. erefore not
all tweets will be indexed or made available via the search interface.
3.4 Overview of Experiments
Our rst experiment analyses tweets collected fromTwier’s Stream
API with the sample method; these sample tweets are collected
during the same time frame as the URL-containing tweets. is
experiment shows us the ratio of URL containing to non-URL con-
taining tweets along with a breakdown of the numbers of tweets
received per day.
Our second experiment replicates one of the experiments carried
out by Grier et al. [15] in which the delay from a URL being tweeted
to appearing in the blacklists is calculated. is experiment shows
what has changed since the 2010 study – particularly since Twier’s
active user base has grown from 30 million in 2010 to over 330
million in 2017 and total number of daily tweets has grown from
35 million in 2010 to over 500 million in 2017.
Our third experiment uses a dierent methodology to the 2010
study [15], in that we use the timestamp for when a blacklisted URL
was rst tweeted to calculate delay to rst appearing in a blacklist.
If a URL is tweeted multiple times then only the rst tweet to
contain that URL will be used to calculate delay. is measurement
is important as it allows us to determine how long it takes for URLs
to appear in blacklists aer they are rst tweeted. is experiment
also includes the Phish Tank and Open Phish databases.
Our fourth experiment is an improvement on the previous exper-
iment in that the Twier Search API system is used to determine
when a URL was rst tweeted. Within Twier’s Search API limit,
of 180 calls per 15 minute window, URLs that appear in blacklists
are searched for on Twier to determine their original tweet date.
is allows us to determine, with more accuracy than the previous
experiment, when a URL was rst tweeted (i.e. if we did not receive
the original tweet containing a given URL in our Twier Stream).
is also provides us with the worst case scenario measurement.
Our h experiment analyses for how long blacklisted tweeted
URLs remain in the GSB blacklist for. In order to carry out this
experiment the timestamp for when a URL rst appears in the
Twier Filter (URL) Stream is compared against the last time the
system matched the same URL in the GSB blacklist. e dierence
between these two timestamps is used as the measurement.
4 IMPLEMENTATION
Our entire system is implemented on a virtual machine running
the Ubuntu operating system, version 16.04 LTS, 8 core CPU, 24 GB
RAM. e measurement framework is wrien in the programming
language Python.
Our Twier collection system uses Twier’s Stream API, imple-
mented via the Tweepy [37] library. Aer authorising Tweepy to
access Twier, the sample() and lter() methods are used to collect
sample and URL containing tweets. e lter method uses key-
words “hp” and “hps” to lter out tweets containing URLs. All
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data received from Twier’s Stream API, using these two methods,
is stored in a MySQL [26] version 5.7.19-0ubuntu0.16.04.1 data-
base in two tables for sample tweets and URL-containing tweets,
respectively.
e URL redirection chain extraction system uses Python’s Re-
quests library [30] to send a HTTP request for each URL using a
Macintosh Safari user agent header so the request appears to come
from a regular user via the Safari web browser. e reason for
seing this header is so the request extracts the same redirection
chain that a legitimate user would see and not a redirection chain
that a bot would see – therefore reducing bias in our results. e
Request library’s Response object contains a History property which
consists of a list of Response objects that were created to complete
the HTTP request. is list is then used to extract the redirection
chain for a given URL in our system.
We use 3 blacklists in our system: GSB, Open Phish and Phish
Tank. To implement our GSB lookup system, the library gglsbl [10]
version 1.0.0 is used. is library allows our system to fetch the
latest GSB hash prexes and also perform lookups against the
database. e library uses the SQLite [34] database for storing
GSB data. e library contains a method update hash prex cache()
which is used to update the URL hash prex database. is method
is called every 10 minutes in the fast GSB lookup system and at the
beginning of each cycle of the slow GSB lookup system.
An important modication was made to the gglsbl library to
improve lookup times for large numbers of URLs. e method
lookup url() is used to lookup an individual URL in the local hash
prex database. It does this by performing an SQLite search for
that URL’s hash prex. is lookup technique caused a boleneck
when testing the system on large volumes of URLs, therefore the
library was modied to output a Python dictionary (hash table) of
all URL hash prexes. Our system can then perform a lookup for
each tweeted URL’s hash prex against this dictionary. Since the
Python dictionary implementation uses a hashmap, the typical time
complexity for this lookup is constant; O(1). is means lookups
are considerably faster than using the o-the-shelf version of the
GSB library.
During our experiment, we observe that the GSB blacklist typi-
cally contains approximately 4.8 million URL hash prexes of which
approximately 3.1 million are unique. Of these, there are approxi-
mately 1 million unique URL hash prexes labelled malware and
approximately 1.8 million unique URL hash prexes labelled social
engineering. e remaining URL hash prexes labels are not used
in our study.
Both the Phish Tank and Open Phish datasets are download
as JSON les from their websites. e URL entries from these
les are then extracted and saved into our local MySQL database.
Metadata stored along with URLs includes discovery timestamps
from the blacklists and timestamps for when URLs were added to
our database. Both datasets are downloaded every hour and new
entries saved in the local database. URL lookups against these two
databases are completed by importing all URLs from both databases
and storing them in a Python dictionary in order to perform faster
lookups, as per our GSB lookup implementation.
Our Twier Search API lookup system uses the Tweepy library
to interact with Twier’s Search API. Aer authorising Tweepy to
access Twier, the Search method is used to search for a given URL.
October November
Twier Sample 105,306,234 100,817,746
— URL 24,085,266 23,478,257
— Non-URL 81,220,968 77,339,489
Twier Filter (URL) 91,871,659 90,719,779
Table 1: Total number of collected Twitter sample and Twit-
ter lter (URL) stream tweets, October and November 2017.
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Figure 2: Total tweets collected per day: sample stream &
lter (URL) stream API, October and November 2017.
is method will return the oldest tweet in Twier’s search history,
that contains a given URL string, if it can be found.
5 RESULTS
5.1 Twitter Dataset Analysis
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(a) Social Engineering, Oct & Nov 2017
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(b) Malware, Oct & Nov 2017
Figure 3: Total unique rst tweeted social engineering &
malware URLs per day that rst appeared in GSB blacklist
within 1month before or aer tweet in October &November
2017.
is rst results subsection provides an overview of the dataset
obtained from collecting tweets via the Twier Stream API Sample
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method during October and November 2017. We collect, approxi-
mately, 3.4M sample tweets and 3M URL-containing tweets per-day.
Overall, the Twier Stream Sample collected 105,306,234 tweets in
October 2017 and 100,817,746 tweets in November 2017; of these,
only 23% contained URLs. e Twier Stream Filter (URL) collected
91,871,659 tweets in October 2017 and 90,719,779 in November 2017,
as shown in Table 1. Figure 2 shows the per-day total number of
Twier Sample Stream tweets, including URL and non-URL contain-
ing tweets, along with total number of Twier Filter (URL) Stream
tweets collected in October and November 2017.
ere are 10,029 unique URLs that rst appeared in the Twier
Stream Filter (URL) in either October or November that subse-
quently appeared in one of the GSB, Open Phish or Phish Tank
blacklists at some point during our experiments. Of these URLs,
5,464 appeared in one of the blacklists within 1 month before or
aer rst appearing in the Twier Filter (URL) Stream, as seen in
Table 2. It is interesting to note that only 9 URLs from Open Phish
and Phish Tank appeared in the Twier Filter (URL) stream during
the October and November timeframe. In October, of the 2 Open
Phish URLs that were tweeted, 1 had been added to the Open Phish
blacklist on the 22nd August 2017 and the other had a delay of 12
days from date rst tweeted to appearing in the blacklist. Of the 2
Phish Tank URLs from October: one had been tweeted on the 15th
October 2017, but was blacklisted by Open Phish on 1st September
2017, the other was blacklisted approximately 5 minutes aer being
tweeted. For November: the 1 Open Phish URL appeared in the
blacklist approximately 5 minutes aer being tweeted. For the 4
Phish Tank URLs, blacklist delays were approximately 32 minutes,
35 minutes, 21 days and 9 days aer tweet. Considerably fewer
tweeted URLs appeared in the Open Phish and Phish Tank blacklists
compared to GSB. One reason for this dierence may be that the
GSB blacklist contains approximately 3 million URLs whereas the
Phish Tank and Open Phish blacklists contain 28,000 URLs com-
bined; there are fewer URLs for Phish Tank and Open Phish to
detect. Another possibility is that Twier is using the Phish Tank
and Open Phish blacklists and therefore preventing users from
tweeting URLs contained within these blacklists. However, if that
were the case, then we would still see URLs in the Twier Stream
before they appear in the Open Phish or Phish Tank blacklists.
Figures 3a and 3b show the total number of unique URLs per
day that rst appeared in the Twier Filter (URL) Stream in the
given month that subsequently rst appeared in the GSB Blacklist,
as either social engineering or malware, within 1 month before or
aer appearing in the Twier Filter (URL) Stream for October and
November 2017.
Findings: ese results show that we collected, approximately,
3.4M sample and 3M URL-containing tweets per day throughout
October and November 2017. Of these, 5,464 unique URLs appeared
in one of the 3 blacklists within 1 month before or aer rst ap-
pearing in the Twier Stream Filter (URL). is volume of tweets
provides us with a good amount of data to explore delay times,
click metrics, and overall time in GSB in the upcoming sections.
We also see there are only 9 URLs from the Open Phish and Phish
Tank blacklists. is may possibly be because the Phish Tank and
Open Phish blacklists contain fewer URLs (approximately 28,000)
compared to GSB (approximately 3 million).
October November
Blacklist URLs Domains URLs Domains
GSB SE? 4,912 397 2,495 268
GSB SE† 3,273 212 930 182
GSB SE§ 295 89 294 73
GSB Malware? 1,563 250 1,054 144
GSB Malware† 718 82 543 65
GSB Malware§ 230 37 131 29
Open Phish? 2 2 1 1
Open Phish† 1 1 1 1
Phish Tank? 2 2 4 3
Phish Tank† 1 1 4 3
Table 2: Number of unique, blacklisted social engineering
(SE) and malware URLs & domains rst tweeted in October
and November 2017.
?Blacklisted anytime during experiment.
†Blacklisted within 1 month from rst tweet date.
§Blacklisted within 1 month from rst tweet date and using
Twitter’s Search API to determine URL rst tweet date.
5.2 Blacklist Delays – All Blacklisted Tweets
In this subsection we replicate one of the experiments carried out
in 2010 by Grier et al. [15]. It is important to note that it is dicult
to replicate their study exactly because their methodology is not
completely explained in their paper. Specically, they do not explain
how a historical copy of the GSB blacklist is acquired or if they allow
a delay period of 1 month before and aer every URL is tweeted. To
the best of our knowledge, based on their paper, this is a replication
of one of the experiments in their study.
In this experiment the delay period for a tweeted URL to appear
in the GSB blacklist is calculated using time of tweet to time rst
appearing in blacklist. If a URL is tweeted multiple times then each
posting is treated as a unique, independent event. is is the same
methodology used by [15]. In our results a negative delay value
represents a URL that appears in the blacklist before it is tweeted
and a positive delay value represents a URL that appears in the
blacklist aer being tweeted. is is because we are measuring the
delay from a URL being tweeted to rst appearing in a blacklist,
so a delay value of 20 days means it took 20 days from that URL
being tweeted to appearing in a blacklist. e Grier et al. [15] study
uses lead and lag times in their measurements, where a lead time
signies a URL that appears on Twier before being blacklisted
and a lag time is used to denote a URL that appears in a blacklist
aer being tweeted. As a result, their lead times are positive and
lag times are negative values.
Our rst experiment looks at URLs that were tweeted during
October and November 2017 which were subsequently labelled as
social engineering in the GSB blacklist within 1 month before or
aer being tweeted. We believe this is the most accurate way to
carry out this measurement since the same timeframe is applied to
all individual tweets, regardless of when they were tweeted in the
month. is methodology is not dened in [15] so it may aect the
comparison. Timestamps for when tweets are received from the
Twier Filter (URL) Stream are used as tweet date and URL hash
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prex timestamps from the GSB blacklist library are used to deter-
mine time rst appeared in GSB blacklist to calculate total delay
from tweet to blacklist, as described in the methodology section of
this paper. During this experiment a total of 7,597 tweets containing
social engineering URLs in the GSB blacklist were recorded in Oc-
tober and 5,193 in November, as seen in Figures 4a and 4b. We then
carry out the same experiment for malware URLs: a total of 1,110
tweets containing malware URLs embedded the GSB blacklist were
recorded in October and 914 in November, as seen in Figures 4c
and 4d. An additional step we take in our experiments, which was
not carried out in [15], is to further investigate anomalies in these
results and to also clean the results by removing the most frequent
domain names. is is explained further in the next subsection. For
tweets containing blacklisted social engineering URLs In October
there is a spike of tweets at -8 days and again between -2 and -4
days. ese spikes are caused by one domain name. For tweets
containing blacklisted social engineering URLs in November, there
is a peak of 3,316 tweets that have a delay time of between 13 and
14 days, as seen in gure 4b. is spike is caused by one domain
name.
When comparing our results to the 2010 study [15] it is impor-
tant to remember that their study had access to a 10% Twier feed
of approximately 35 million tweets per day in 2010; our 2017 study
collects approximately 3 million URL-containing tweets per day –
comparable numbers. e rst noticeable dierence is that there
are a greater number of overall tweets containing blacklisted social
engineering URLs in our study. Whereas [15] sees a greater num-
ber of tweets containing malware URLs appear in GSB aer they
have been tweeted. We see signicantly more tweets containing
blacklisted URLs appearing on Twier aer they have appeared in
the GSB blacklist for both social engineering and malware URLs.
In our study, for social engineering tweets in November, the delay
with the greatest number of tweets is 13.5 days with approximately
3,275 tweets. In [15], the delay with the greatest number of tweets
approximately -6 days with approximately 58 tweets. In our study,
when looking at social engineering tweets in October, the delay
with the greatest number of tweets is 26 days with 790 tweets. is
shows that, in our results, there is a greater volume of social en-
gineering tweets appearing on Twier. e results in [15] show
that the average lag time for social engineering tweets is 9.01 days
and the average lead period is -2.57 days. For malware tweets the
average lag time is 24.90 days and the average lead time is -29.58
days. e results for the average lead and lag times for our experi-
ments can be seen in Table 3. ese gures show that the lag time
averages can vary depending on if the most frequent domain names
are included in the calculation, as is the case for social engineering
and malware tweets in October.
Findings: One of the most signicant dierences between our
results and those in 2010 [15] is that, in our results, there are sub-
stantially more URLs being posted to Twier aer they appear in
the GSB blacklist, compared to [15]. is suggests that Twier has
altered its ltering process to allow some URLs blacklisted by GSB
to be tweeted or they may have stopped using the GSB blacklist
altogether and built their own URL ltering system.
GSB SE GSB Malware
Oct Nov Oct Nov
Avg. lag (days) 22.62 12.71 17.99 15.02
Avg. lag - top
domains removed
(days)
11.05 13.37 15.55
Avg. lead (days) -5.39 -12.18 -19.41 -12.57
Avg. lead - top
domains removed
(days)
-5.46 -18.24 -12.73
Table 3: Average delay times for all tweeted blacklisted so-
cial engineering (SE) and malware URL delays. Lead and lag
times indicate appearing in blacklist before or aer being
tweeted, respectively.
5.3 Blacklist Delays – From Time of First Tweet
In this subsection we use a dierent methodology to [15] in that
the timestamp for when a blacklisted URL was rst tweeted is
used to calculate delay to rst appearing in a blacklist. is new
methodology is important as it allows us to determine how long it
takes for URLs to appear in blacklists aer they are rst tweeted –
therefore calculating how long users are exposed to aacks for. If a
URL is tweeted multiple times then only the rst tweet to contain
that URL will be used to calculate delay. One of the main problems
with the measurement carried out in [15] is that a URL may be
tweeted at a certain point in time, then tweeted again on multiple
occasions at a much later point in time; closer to the point at which
that URL becomes blacklisted. is then skews the results because,
in this example, the average delay time for that URL to become
blacklisted, when calculated from all tweet times containing that
URL, will be less when compared to just the time of rst tweet to
blacklist delay.
In this experiment we look at unique URLs that were rst tweeted
during October and November 2017 which were subsequently la-
belled as social engineering in the GSB blacklist within 1 month
before or aer being tweeted. Timestamps for when tweets were
received from the Twier Filter (URL) Stream are used as the tweet
date and URL hash prex timestamps from the GSB blacklist li-
brary are used to determine time rst appeared in GSB blacklist
to calculate total delay from tweet to blacklist, as described in
the methodology section. During this experiment a total of 3,273
unique social engineering URLs were recorded in October and 930
in November.
During October the majority of social engineering URLs saw a
delay period of approximately 18 to 26 days from being tweeted
to appearing in the GSB blacklist. Upon further investigation it
was discovered that 7 domain names accounted for 76% of the
total dataset, 2,487 URLs, as shown in Table 4. All of the URLs
contained within this dataset are HTTP ; none of them are HTTPS.
We extract the domain name for each URL per these examples:
hp://example.com /some-web-page.html, hp://subdomain. exam-
ple.com, hps://example.com /some-secure-page.html etc. Figure
5a shows frequency distribution for both the original 3,273 URLs
along with the remaining 426 URLs aer the top 7 domains names
have been removed. is histogram, with the top 7 URLs removed,
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Figure 4: Delay time for all tweets containing GSB blacklisted URLs (including most frequent domain names) labelled social
engineering and malware, November and October 2017.
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Figure 5: Delay from time of URL rst tweet to appearing in GSB blacklist (including most frequent domain names) labelled
social engineering and malware, November and October 2017.
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Figure 6: Social engineering URLs: delay from tweet to rst
appearing in GSB blacklist (Figures 5a and 5b), rst 24 hours,
October & November 2017.
shows that the majority of URLs appeared in the GSB blacklist
within 6 hours of being tweeted, as seen, aer being zoomed in to
24 hours, in Figure 6a. A similar paern is also seen in November
where there is a peak at around 6 hours, as seen in Figure 6b, al-
though still a high number of URLs are blacklisted between 6 and
24 hours. Figures 5a-5d and 6a-6b show the delay period between
tweet and blacklist, with the number of unique URLs on the y axis
and delay period along the x axis. A delay period greater than zero
means that the URL appeared in the GSB blacklist aer it appeared
on Twier. A delay of less than zero means that it was already
in the GSB blacklist at time of Tweet. e negative delay values,
in these graphs, show that large numbers of URLs were tweeted
aer they appeared in the GSB blacklist. As with the previous
subsection, this further suggests that Twier are either not using
the GSB blacklist or are allowing some URLs in GSB to be tweeted.
is means that Twier users are exposed to social engineering
and malware aacks.
In terms of the impact of these tweets, looking at just the top
7 most frequent domains that were rst tweeted in October 2017
and appeared in GSB within 1 month before or aer being tweeted,
these 2,487 unique URLs were tweeted by 1,227 individual Twit-
ter accounts, making up 4,930 total tweets. ese 1,227 Twier
accounts have a combined number of 131,116,820 followers giving
a sense of the total number of Twier users potentially exposed to
these social engineering tweets.
Figure 7a shows the distribution of these top 7 domains names
in the dataset showing that Domains 1, 2, 3, 5 and 6 appear predom-
inantly towards the 16 to 30 day delay mark with a few outliers
around the 14 to 16 day mark, the majority of Domain 4 spans from
-5 to 26 days and Domain 7 stays around the 25 to 31 day mark.
When comparing the most frequently tweeted domains that are
agged as social engineering in GSB in October and November there
are 4 domains names that appear in both months. is shows that,
during the two months in which we collected data from Twier and
GSB, there were a number of large campaigns that spanned across
both of these months. One of these domain names is in the Alexa
top 100, suggesting that this website had become compromised,
potentially by some sort of social engineering advert. One theory
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Figure 7: Box plots showing most frequent social engineer-
ing & malware domains for October 2017.
Domain TLD Number of URLs
1 .cn 614
2 .cn 582
3 .com 554
4 .com 273
5 .cn 203
6 .cn 188
7 .life 73
Table 4: October 2017 seven most frequent social engineer-
ing domains tweeted (domain names redacted).
as to why Twier continues to allow URLs from this domain, and
others like it, to be tweeted on its network is because the main
web browsers (such as Chrome, Safari, Firefox etc.) have built-in
protection – which should prevent users from visiting dangerous
websites. Twier can then outsource the protection of its users
to the web browsers. is is also the case on both the Android
and iOS Twier apps whereby links are scanned by the Chrome
and Safari web browser blacklists. One of the main weaknesses
to this approach is that there may be an aack space when web
browsers update their blacklists. If a user visits a newly blacklisted
website, but their web browser has not updated their local copy of
the blacklist, then the user will be allowed to visit the dangerous
website without any warnings – exposing them to the aack.
When analysing the target of the social engineering campaign
tweets in October many of the tweets appear to be using click-bait
techniques. ese tweets oen use misleading titles to promote,
for example, health techniques with lile evidence to backup their
claims. Examples of tweets seen in our dataset include “is IsWhat
HappensWhen You Pressis Point Near Your Ear For OneMinute”
and “is Leaking From Your Eye Can Be a Sign of a Dangerous
Eye Infection”. ese click-bait techniques are commonly used to
aract large numbers of people to a website in order to generate
revenue from adverts.
We then repeat the experiment, only this time analysing all
tweeted malware URLs, as classied by GSB. A total of 718 unique
malware URLs were recorded during the same timeframe in October
2017 and 543 unique malware URLs in November 2017. When
looking at the frequency distribution of delays, the largest peak of
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Figure 8: Delay from rst tweet to rst appearing in GSB
blacklist – social engineering and malware, October and No-
vember 2017.
GSB blacklisted malware URLs in October occurs at approximately
25 days and was caused by 2 domain names (consisting of 219 and
161 URLs) making up 39% of the October dataset of 718 URLs. e
total number of tweeted Malware URLs in October can be seen in
Figure 5c and shows frequency distribution for the month including
the 2 outlying domain names. Figure 7b shows the distribution of
these top 2 domain names in the dataset, showing that Domain 1
mostly covered days 5 to 25, with its median at approximately 19.5
days. Domain 2 is predominantly spread over the -20 to 12 day delay
period, with its median being just over 0 days. Finally, in November
2017, the largest peak appears at around 14 days and is caused by
1 outlying domain name (consisting of 140 URLs) which made up
26% of the dataset. e frequency distribution for November can
be seen in Figure 5d.
Figure 8 shows a boxplot of tweeted GSB blacklisted social engi-
neering and malware URL delays in October and November 2017.
e rst row shows the distribution of social engineering URLs in
October 2017, before the top 7 domains were removed whilst the
second row shows the same timeframe but with the top 7 domains
removed. Row three shows GSB blacklisted social engineering URLs
in November, row four shows malware URLs in October and row
ve shows malware URLs in November 2017. is shows that, for
social engineering URLs, the median delay time was around 7 days
in October and just over 0 days in November. For malware URLs
the median delay was around 11 days in October and around 8.5
days in November.
ese graphs show that GSB appears to be quicker at detecting
social engineering websites than malware websites. One reason
for this may be that the criteria for the social engineering ag may
include a wider net. erefore, as we saw with the Alexa top 100
domain, some high trac websites may become blacklisted when
they fall into this net. Whereas agging a website in the malware
blacklist requires Google to be certain the website is harming - or
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Figure 9: Delay from rst tweet to rst appearing in GSB blacklist – using Twitter Search API to determine URL rst tweet
date – social engineering and malware, October and November 2017.
aempting to harm - the user’s computer in some way. is poten-
tially stricter classication may take more time to conrm and may
explain why malware is slower to detect than social engineering in
our results.
Findings: One of the key takeaways from these experiments
is that Twier allow considerably more URLs to be tweeted aer
appearing in the GSB blacklist, compared to the 2010 study [15]. As
previously mentioned, this may be because Twier is relying more
on web browsers’ built-in protection from malware and phishing
URLs. However, one of the biggest weaknesses to this approach
is that the built-in blacklists used by web browsers take time to
update and this creates an aack space. e results in this section
also show there is a signicant delay – 20 to 30 days in some cases
– before URLs are blacklisted. We also see where a combined total
of 131,116,820 Twier users are exposed to 2,487 unique blacklisted
URLs. is means Twier users are exposed to these dangerous
aacks for a substantial amount of time.
Even though the experiments in this subsection do not identify
absolute earliest time of tweet, our delay measurement will always
be an underestimate. erefore the real situation, in terms of Twier
users being exposed to dangerous URLs due to blacklist delay times,
is much worse. is methodological weakness is addressed in the
next subsection.
5.4 Blacklist Delays – Twitter Search API
e experiments in this subsection aim to further improve the
accuracy of the experiments carried out in the previous subsection.
We do this by making use of Twier’s Search API to determine
the original tweet date for blacklisted URLs. Also, because we
use Twier’s 1% feed of tweets there may be instances where a
URL appears outside of our Twier Stream. By using Twier’s
Search API we can determine when a given URL was tweeted. e
measurements taken in this experiment are the same as in the
previous subsection, that is the delay between a blacklisted URL
rst being tweeted and rst appearing in the GSB blacklist within
1 month before of aer tweet date, only in this section each URL is
searched for on Twier and the timestamp of that search result is
used for the delay calculation. Using this method, in October 2017,
295 social engineering and 230 malware URLs are recorded; their
delays can be seen in Figures 9a and 9c. In November 2017, 284
social engineering and 131 malware URLs are recorded and can be
seen in Figures 9b and 9d.
It is important to note that there are signicantly fewer URLs
in this part of the dataset. is is because Twier states that its
Search API is not a complete search, therefore some URLs we try to
determine original tweet timestamps for cannot be found. In this
case these URLs are dropped from the dataset. A clear paern that
emerges in all 4 of these graphs is that there are no URLs with a
delay from rst tweet to rst blacklist of more than 10 days. is
is because Twier’s Search API is limited to 7-10 days; any URLs
the system searches for that appeared in the GSB blacklist more
than 7-10 days aer being tweeted will not show up in a Twier
search if the URL has not been tweeted again since. is limits
these graphs, since they show a reduced picture of delays between
URLs being tweeted and appearing in the GSB blacklist. However,
as seen in the previous two sections, there are still high numbers
of URLs already in the GSB blacklist at time of tweet.
Findings: Measurements in the previous subsection do not show
the worst-case scenario in terms of delay from rst tweet to appear-
ing in blacklist because URLs may have been previously tweeted.
However, results in this section, whilst showing fewer URLs in the
dataset, do show the worst case scenario for delay from rst tweet
to blacklist membership. is adds additional evidence that Twier
are not blocking all GSB URLs and may to be relying on other,
possibly third-party techniques, to protect its users against aacks.
ere is also a signicant number of URLs that take between 0
and 10 days to appear in the GSB blacklist – meaning users are
exposed to social engineering and malware aacks during these
delay periods.
5.5 Blacklisted URL Clicks
To explore the impact of tweets that contain blacklisted URLs, we
lookup Bitly URLs that either directly appear in or are embedded
in the redirection chain that leads to the GSB blacklist, in our
dataset. Bitly [3] is a URL shortening service that also provide
public analytics for URL clicks, referrers, and location, via an API.
By extracting Bitly links from our dataset of tweeted URLs that
subsequently appear in the GSB blacklist, we can then use the Bitly
API to lookup how many clicks each URL received.
Table 5 shows, from our dataset of tweeted URLs that subse-
quently appeared in the GSB blacklist, the total number of unique
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GSB SE GSB Malware
Oct Nov Oct Nov
Total tweets
containing Bitly
URLs
1126 146 32 103
Total unique Bitly
URLs
376 141 30 66
Percentage of all
blacklisted URLs
in this category
and timeframe
11% 15% 4% 12%
Total Bitly clicks 991,012 450,039 61,140 194,503
Table 5: Total number of tweets containing Bitly URLs, to-
tal number of unique Bitly URLs, percentage of all URLs
for each category and timeframe, and total Bitly clicks for
tweets containing GSB blacklisted social engineering (SE)
and malware URLs, in our dataset, in October and Novem-
ber 2017.
Bitly URLs, percentage of all URLs in this category and timeframe,
total number of tweets containing Bitly URLs for this category and
timeframe, and total number of Bitly URL clicks, during October
and November 2017. In October, there were 376 unique Bitly URLs
that were either agged themselves or part of a redirection chain
that was in the GSB blacklist as social engineering. ese 376 Bitly
URLs make up 11% of the 3,273 total social engineering URLs de-
tected in that month in our dataset. e total number of clicks for
this 11% is 991,012.
To investigate the impact of tweeting a blacklisted URL to a
Twier account with a high number of followers, we extracted a
blacklisted URL, from our dataset, that uses Bitly. e blacklisted
Bitly URL was tweeted by an account with 3.7 million followers on
October 24 and agged as social engineering in GSB on November
11. e URL received 276 clicks during the week of October 22 2017,
of which 270 came from Twier. 176 of these clicks came from the
USA, 19 from Canada, 12 from the UK and the remaining 34 from
elsewhere. is URL did not receive any more clicks aer the week
of October 22 at which point it appears to have been blocked by
Bitly. is example shows that a single tweet, from a high follower
account, posting a dangerous URL, can receive a high number of
global clicks – therefore exposing a large amount of Twier users
to the aack. It also shows that GSB took 18 days to add the URL
to its blacklist, while Bitly appears to have blocked the URL much
sooner. In this scenario, Twier appears to have outsourced its
lter to Bitly – relying on Bitly to protect Twier’s own users.
Findings: ese results show that, in onemonth alone, 1,052,152
clicks were exposed to dangerous malware and social engineering
aacks due to Twier not blocking these harmful URLs. ese click
metrics represent 11% of our dataset, which is, approximately, 1%
of all global tweets on Twier – giving a sense of the scale and
impact caused by Twier allowing blacklisted URLs to appear on
their social network.
5.6 Posting Blacklisted URLs to Twitter
In a separate experiment we created a private account on Twier
whereby the account’s tweets were not publicly visible. We then
aempted to tweet a sample of 30 blacklisted URLs: 10 from GSB,
10 from Open Phish and 10 from Phish Tank. In this experiment, 8
of the Open Phish URLs and 9 of the Phish Tank URLs could not be
posted to Twier. All of the GSB URLs were posted successfully to
Twier. For tweets containing blacklisted URLs that could not be
posted to Twier this error message was displayed: “is request
looks like it might be automated. To protect our users from spam
and othermalicious activity, we can’t complete this action right now.
Please try again later”. We were able to tweet messages that did
not contain blacklisted URLs without receiving this error message.
is suggests that Twier may display this generic error message
when URLs that it has ltered are requested to be tweeted on the
social network. It is important to note that this was a small-scale
study and that the Twier account used for this experiment was set
to private, therefore all tweets were hidden from the public. Public
Twier accounts may see dierent results in this experiment – for
example: public tweets may go through a stricter ltering process.
Due to ethical considerations, we did not post any public tweets
containing blacklisted URLs.
Findings: e outcome of this experiment shows that Twier
appears to be blocking more URLs on the Phish Tank and Open
Phish blacklists compared to GSB. Providing further evidence that
Twier is not using the GSB blacklist – therefore exposing users to
dangerous URLs.
5.7 URL Time in GSB
is section explores the duration of time that unique URLs re-
mained in the GSB blacklist for. Each experiment takes all unique
URLs that were rst tweeted in a given month, then, if a URL is not
in GSB at time of tweet, the duration in GSB is calculated as when
the system rst detects the URL in GSB to when the system last saw
the same URL in GSB. If a URL is already in GSB at time of tweet
then the GSB library URL hash prex timestamp is used as time
rst blacklisted and the time our system last saw the URL in GSB
as the nal timestamp. e dierence between these timestamps is
used to calculate total time in GSB for each URL. ese duration
periods are then ploed on histograms to show the frequency of
dierent duration in GSB for all URLs.
Figures 10a and 10b show the duration of time that social engi-
neering URLs spent in the GSB blacklist in October and November
2017 and Figures 10c and 10d show the duration of time malware
URLs appeared in the GSB blacklist in October and November 2017.
All four of these graphs have a logarithmic scale on the y axis so
both high and low numbers are illustrated clearly.
Findings: One of the main conclusions from these graphs is
that there is a general downward trend. is shows that, over time,
the number of URLs in the GSB blacklist is reducing. is means
that URLs are removed from the blacklist, presumably once they
are no-longer a threat. Our experiment ran for 150 days and there
were over 1,000 URLs remaining in the blacklist, for each category,
at the end of the experiment – meaning that many URLs remained
in the GSB blacklist for at least 150 days. Some of these URLs may
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Figure 10: Unique social engineering & malware URLs duration in GSB – rst tweeted October, November 2017.
still be dangerous, however, there may be false positives in this
blacklist which would mean these URLs are, unnecessarily, being
blocked. Exploring long-term false positives in GSB is something
we may explore in future work.
6 DISCUSSION
6.1 Limitations
Twier’s Search API is limited to 7-10 days and is not a complete
search, therefore the resulting dataset in Section 5.4 is reduced. De-
spite this, the methodology increases accuracy of both the dataset
and results in Section 5.3. ereby producing the worst case sce-
nario result, from the perspective of users, when calculating delay
from rst tweet to rst appearing in blacklist.
Twier’s approximately 1% data stream provides a reduced dataset,
therefore limiting the determination of original URL tweet times-
tamps (i.e. if a URL is tweeted outside the data stream). We com-
pensate as much as possible for this by using techniques such as
Twier’s Search API to determine rst tweet timestamps.
Our study may capture benign websites that became compro-
mised. In future work we may explore compromised websites fur-
ther, for example, by analysing percentage of compromised versus
aack websites in our results (using GSB’s terminology).
GSB uses path prex expansion; iteratively trying broader and
broader URLs (e.g., x.y.z/a/b/c, x.y.z/a/, x.y.z, y.z). is could result in
newly blacklisted hosts, from fresh incidents, being misinterpreted
as missed historical URLs. Potential mitigation could involve GSB
library modication to ag if entire domains become blacklisted.
Results could then exclude blacklisted domains.
We do not detect tweets containing phishing or malicious URLs
that never make it into GSB. erefore GSB is our “ground truth”.
We aempt to mitigate this by using the Open Phish and Phish
Tank blacklists.
6.2 Twitter Filter Analysis
We have hypothesised that Twier may have developed their own
method to lter dangerous URLs from their network, to protect their
users, and are no longer using the GSB blacklist. Whilst we could
carry out experiments to analyse this further, we would essentially
be “reverse engineering” Twier’s ltering process. It is hard to do
this without violating Twier’s terms of use.
7 CONCLUSION
is paper examined how eective URL blacklists are in protect-
ing Twier users against phishing and malware aacks. We anal-
ysed over 182 million URL-containing public tweets collected from
Twier’s Stream API, over a 2 month period, and compared these
URLs against 3 popular social engineering, phishing, and malware
blacklists. Our main discovery was that, although the majority
of phishing and malware URLs are detected by the GSB blacklist
(which is used by popular web browsers) within 6 hours of being
tweeted, there are still a large number of URLs that take at least
20 days to appear in GSB. We discovered 4,930 tweets containing
URLs leading to social engineering websites that took between 18
and 30 days to appear in the blacklist. Between them, these 4,930
tweets had been tweeted to over 131 million Twier users. We
also discovered 1,126 tweets containing 376 blacklisted Bitly URLs
that had received a combined total of 991,012 clicks. ese URLs
represented 11% of the total blacklisted social engineering URLs
in that month. e fact that the GSB blacklist can take weeks to
detect dangerous URLs poses serious security risks to Twier users:
tweets containing blacklisted URLs are sent to large numbers of fol-
lowers and receive a signicant amount of clicks, thereby exposing
users to dangerous websites. Conversely, and surprisingly to us,
there are large numbers of URLs being tweeted that have already
been blacklisted by GSB. is strongly indicates that Twier is not
using the GSB blacklist to block malicious tweets at the time of
tweeting, contrary to what was once reported to be the case [24].
In summary, whilst blacklists are reasonably eective at protecting
Twier users from phishing and malware aacks, there is still an
unprotected space that leaves Twier users vulnerable.
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